Beauty and Truth in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy

Summer school of the EGSAMP-Network

August 21-23, 2013, at VU University Amsterdam

Beauty and truth are traditionally closely linked and often even considered convertible. The nature of their relation, however, is far from clear. Recently, scholars in the field of ancient and medieval philosophy have opened various debates to clarify the origins and nature of the relation between these two philosophical concepts. For example, scholars have recently argued on the basis of the Platonic tradition, that beauty equals truth in the various aspects of knowledge and science. Now, are beauty and truth really convertible? In medieval philosophy, the status of the concept of beauty as a transcendental notion is the topic of a lively debate. The notion of beauty, as one of the general modes consequent upon being, seems to provide a synthesis of truth and goodness, which, according to some scholars, concludes the doctrine of the transcendentals. Others, who deny that beauty is such a general mode, still acknowledge the intimate relation between beauty, goodness, and truth. In all these debates, the philosophical discussion of beauty and truth is clearly not restricted to aesthetics or logic; the notions are understood in a realist framework and discussed as basic concepts of metaphysics. In the present summer school, questions on truth and beauty, being and goodness, on aesthetics, morality, logic, epistemology, and metaphysics are discussed by an international community of both PhD candidates and senior scholars in the field of ancient and medieval philosophy.

The EGSAMP summer school presents the work done on ancient and medieval philosophy of its members in the Rhineland, i.e. at VU University Amsterdam, the universities of Leiden and Nijmegen, the university of Louvain, and the university of Cologne. Furthermore, the summer school provides a podium for PhD-candidates to present their projects to an audience of senior scholars and profit from scholarly advice given in a friendly climate – a successful format, as the EGSAMP summer schools in recent years have demonstrated. A special section shall be devoted to the presentation of projects by research master-students from the historical section of the Dutch Research School of Philosophy (OZSW), of Oikos, the Dutch Research School for Classics, and of the Dutch Research School for Medieval Studies. Thus, the EGSAMP summer school 2013 will give young scholars from universities across Europe the opportunity to present their work, often for the first time, to the international community. The summer school 2013 is open for PhD-candidates and senior scholars of the Dutch research school for philosophy.

The conference will take place at the filmzaal PThU, first floor in the main building of VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam.
Program:

**Wednesday, August 21st:**
14.00-15.30 Opening: Wouter Goris & Marije Martijn

15.30-16.00 Coffee Break

16.00-18.00 First Session of PhD- and Broader Project-Presentations (chair Marije Martijn)
– Fiorella Retucci (Cologne): The Durand-Project at the Thomas-Institut. Some Observations on the Manuscript Tradition
– Thomas Jeschke (Cologne): Durand on the Soul: A Paradigm of 14th-Century Philosophical Psychology
– Suzanne Metselaar (Amsterdam): Bonaventure’s Doctrine of God as First Known
– Can Laurens Loewe (Louvain): Thomist Truthmakers

20.30 Dinner at Barra, Eerste Sweelinckstraat 23 (Tram 3 of 25, halte Ceintuurbaan/Van Woustraat)

**Thursday, August 22nd:**
09.00-10.00 Second Session of PhD- and Broader Project-Presentations (Chair Andreas Speer)
– Mareike Hauer (Louvain): Simplicius on the priority of the quality over the qualified
– Qi Wang (Leiden): Boethius’ Mathematics. Introduction of Boethius’ Arithmetic and Music and Their Application in the *Consolation of Philosophy*

10.00-11.00 Ancient and Medieval Philosophy in Louvain

11.00-11.30 Coffee Break

11.30-12.30 Ancient and Medieval Philosophy in Leiden/Nijmegen

12.30-14.00 Lunch

Afternoon: Excursion to the Rijksmuseum
18.00-20.00 Third Session of PhD- and Broader Project-Presentations (Chair Frans de Haas)
– Philipp Steinkrüger (Louvain): Aristotle on Beauty and Mathematics
– Daniël de Haan (Louvain): Avicenna’s Doctrine of Transcendental Truth (ḥaqīqa)
– Luca Gili (Louvain): Truth conditions for contingency propositions in Thomas Aquinas.

20.30 Dinner at Bazar Amsterdam, Albert Cuypstraat 182 (Tram 16 of 24, halte Albert Cuypstraat)

Friday, August 23rd:

09.00-10.00 Fourth Session of PhD- and Broader Project-Presentations (Chair Jan Opsomer)
– Thomas Wauters (Louvain): Thinking of matter in Gregory of Nyssa’s De Opificio hominis. The absence of a substrate to the material world
– Smilen Markov (Sophia): The Epistemic Structure as an Animate Statue – Psellos’ concept of Christian Philosophy
10.00-11.00 Ancient and Medieval Philosophy in Cologne

11.00-11.30 Coffee Break

11.30-12.30 Ancient and Medieval Philosophy in Amsterdam

12.30-14.00 Lunch

14.00-16.00 Fifth Session of PhD- and Broader Project-Presentations (Chair Paul Bakker)
– Arianna Betti (Amsterdam): Computational Tools for the History of Philosophy
– Sabrina Mock (Cologne): Handeln gemäß bestem Logos – Zum Verhältnis von gerechtem Handeln und Gesetzesbefolgung in Platons Kriton
– Hedwig Gaasterland (Leiden): Stoic Reception in Nietzsche’s Concept of Amor Fati
– Nicolas Faucher (Paris): The Franciscans’ theories of faith at the end of the XIIIth century

16.00-16.30 Coffee Break
16.30-17.30 Sixth Session of PhD- and Broader Project-Presentations (Chair Loris Sturlese)
– Friederike Schmiga (Bari): Intellectual Curiosity in Medieval Philosophy
– Adi Efal (Cologne): Art and habitus: Preliminary remarks, fundamental difficulties
17.30-18.30 Lecture Guy Guldentops (Cologne): “Hyacinth Chalvet on Beauty – Keeping Up Anti-Scholastic Appearances.”

20.30 Dinner at Puri Mas, Lange Leidsedwarsstraat 37-31, 1st floor (Tram 1, 2 of 5 halte Leidseplein)
Abstracts:

Adi Efal (Cologne): Art and habitus: Preliminary remarks, fundamental difficulties

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, iv, 6 (1140a21), the Philosopher writes: ‘Art (ποιητική), therefore, is a rational habitus (ξίς), concerned with making (ποιεῖν), which reasons truly.’

My contribution would try to furnish the conceptual foundation for further discussion of the complex relation between art and habitus within an Aristotelian+Thomistic framework. I would try to phrase as clearly and orderly as possible the highly complex relationship between, on the one hand, art (technē/ ars, being related mainly to the field of production (poiesis/ operatio, labor, fabricatius)) and on the other hand habitus (hexis), being usually related to moral doing (praxis, actus, moralia)), and even determined as the basis for ethical virtue.

The more general, universal problem arising from this complex state of affairs is how to articulate the productive capacity of art within a habitual framework, which is fundamentally one of self-conservation and self-maintenance of actions. Therefore, one has to pave the path of art, conceived as a habitus, between making (facere) and doing (agere), and this complicates things even more, as the Philosopher distinguishes clearly between praxis and poiesis (EN 1140a6), and treats both domains as essentially separate.

In order to try and make-sense of this basic ambivalent structure, one would have to give an account of several few further conceptual building-blocks to be found both in Aristotle and in Thomas, related to the actualization and putting-into-operation of the principle (archē, principium) regulating the artistic act. This formal principle may also account for the presence of ‘Beauty’ in the artistic product.

Finally, one should wonder, whether such a re-organization of the field of discussing art may have something to contribute to present-days discussions regarding the collapse of the ‘Aesthetic’ as the platform for accounting for artworks.

Nicolas Faucher (Paris): The Franciscans’ theories of faith at the end of the XIIIth century

The topic of my PhD dissertation is faith as it is treated epistemologically and psychologically by Franciscan thinkers from Alexander of Hales to Duns Scotus. I am trying to determine what the warrants of faith are, according to three main lines of inquiry: first, I investigate the nature of the psychological mechanisms that underlie faith as a habitus of the soul which allows for a firmness of intellectual assent that is on par with that of evident science, while still involving will in a preeminent position, without which faith could not be meritorious and thus not a virtue; second, I look at how theologians endeavour to prove that it is a good thing to not be content with merely opinion and science and why it is necessary to have a relation to truth that involves the certainty of science and the obscurity of opinion; third, I try to determine what differentiates, for these thinkers, Catholic faith and heretical or unfaithful beliefs, if even they admit that there is a possible comparison, and what warrants the approval of one and the rejection of the others.

I will be briefly explaining how we can establish the existence of an illuminationism of faith shared by Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure and a number of thinkers following Bonaventure including Richard of Middleton and Matthew of Aquasparta, among Franciscans, and Henry of Ghent, in which the role of the will is restricted to supernatural, meritorious faith inasmuch as God allows for the believer to believe without willing it but the believer himself may choose to believe merely for the sake of truth or to develop his virtues in order to articulate his belief and the acts he accomplishes for the love of God and to reach salvation. In such a view, it is easy to understand why science is not considered superior to cognition through faith and why Alexander of Hales even considers that faith evacuates science when it occurs, and why only a passing interest for heretics is to be found among these authors. In opposition to such a model stand Peter John Olivi and Duns Scotus (as influenced by Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines), who both defend, though in very different ways, a vision of faith where the will plays a much more important role, that of causally making the intellect assent to truth rather than simply modifying the relationship the believer has to a truth which is directly accessible through illumination. Correspondingly, Catholic faith is defined in much sharper contrast to science than in the first tradition and the psychology of heresy is elaborated upon and seems quite close to the psychology of true faith.

Luca Gili (Louvain): Truth conditions for contingency propositions in Thomas Aquinas

The aim of this project is to understand which for Aquinas the truth conditions for statements such as:

(a) A is contingently B.

According to Aristotle, a distinction should be posit between the contingency according to which kinds have contingently a certain property, and that according to which individuals have contingently a certain property.
Aristotle makes this distinction in Prior Analytics A, 13, where he expands a definition of possibility which echoes that of Metaphysics Θ, 4. This interesting distinction allows us to say that, if K is a kind term, and a, b, c are individuals falling under K, it can be said that
1) K is contingently φ
iff there is at least one instant in time in which some of the Ks are φ.
However, from the truth of 1) it does not follow that there is an instant of time in which a is φ, or in which b is φ, etc.
In other words, I read Metaphysics Θ, 4 against the background of Prior Analytics A, 13-15, and I maintain that Aristotle is thoroughly endorsing the principle of plenitude in his metaphysical description of reality.
However, Aristotle also believes that in physics some processes happen 'in most cases', but not in all cases, and introduces contingency propositions in order to express these natural processes too; among these processes, he distinguishes different kinds of contingency, depending on the frequency with which the predicative relation expressed by the corresponding contingency proposition is actually the case (cf. Prior Analytics A, 13, 32 b4-22).
This latter distinction bring us to avoid the endorsement of the principle of plenitude at the level of individuals, even though at species or higher level we might still think that Aristotle accepted the principle (namely, that a given species K has contingently a property φ, if there is at least one instant in time in which some of the Ks are φ).
As a consequence, the 'metaphysical' acceptance of the principle which we found in Metaphysics Θ, 4 might still be defended, without ascribing to Aristotle a rigid deterministic view with respect to (individual) natural changes.
Averroes' understanding of change in his commentary on the Metaphysics echoes Aristotle's own, and there is good evidence for claiming that Averroes endorsed the principle of plenitude too; Averroes is strictly bound to the doctrine expanded in Aristotle's Metaphysics, and thus we do not find in his writings the anti-deterministic tendency, which I have sketched above, and which Aristotle expounded mostly in his Prior Analytics.
Aquinas, on the contrary, distanced himself from both Aristotle's and Averroes' deterministic tendencies scattered in the Metaphysics and in Averroes' commentary on the Metaphysics: Aquinas adopted the anti-deterministic view offered by Aristotle in his Prior Analytics, and consistently maintained this doctrine in his writings. Commenting on Metaphysics Θ, 4, Aquinas says that there are many possibilities which fail to actualize, despite Aristotle's text states the contrary claim. This interpretation of Aquinas is consistent with his philosophy, which rejects determinism. Some scholars have suggested that Aquinas endorsed the principle of plenitude on the basis of his tertia via, but there is stronger evidence in other writings of Aquinas that he did not maintain this view. As a consequence, I maintain that a proposition like (a) is true, even if there is no instant in time at which B actually holds of A.

Guy Guldentops (Cologne): Hyacinth Chalvet on Beauty – Keeping Up Anti-Scholastic Appearances

Chalvet, a seventeenth-century Dominican who intends to free theology from scholasticism, devotes book XIII of volume I of his Theologus Ecclesiastes (1653) to beauty. Even though this treatise on beauty is a compilation with hardly any originality, it is quite fascinating, as it depends on a bizarre combination of sources and offers a broad panorama of classical, medieval and even early modern ideas on beauty. Chalvet mainly quotes Ficino and ancient Platonic philosophers (Plato, Plotinus, Boethius, and Hermes Trismegistus), but also relies on Stoic authors (Seneca and Lipsius) and Christian theologians (Church Fathers, Ps.-Dionysius, Anselm, Bernard, Aquinas, Holcot, and Denys the Cartusian). The following topics will be presented: (1) beauty in general; (2) divine beauty; (3) the soul's beauty; (4) corporeal beauty. It will be argued that it is misleading to characterize Chalvet's non-aesthetic theory of beauty as medieval or modern.

Daniël de Haan (Louvain): Avicenna’s Doctrine of Transcendental Truth (haqīqa)

In this study I shall explore Avicenna’s doctrine of truth as it is presented within the epistemological, ontological, aetiological, and theological investigations of his Metaphysics of the Healing (al-Iḥtiyāt al-Sūh). My aim is to show that Avicenna has a systematic and robust doctrine of transcendental truth that is correlated with the first principles of his metaphysics. These first principles, along with Avicenna’s innovative appropriation of Aristotle’s four senses of being, are fundamental to his metaphysics, for it is within Avicenna’s presentation of the first principles of metaphysics that he introduces his doctrine of truth and its threefold division into epistemological, ontological, and theological truth. The first section of the paper will outline Avicenna’s innovative account of the first principles of metaphysics and the four senses of being. The second part will survey Aristotle’s account of truth from Metaphysics II, IV, and VI. In the final section of the paper I shall first show how these elements were integrated into Avicenna’s systematic and original
account of transcendental truth, and then I shall conclude the paper by briefly suggesting how Avicenna’s doctrine of transcendental truth influenced Thomas Aquinas’s account of truth in *De veritate*, q. 1.

Mareike Hauer (Louvain): Simplicius on the priority of the quality over the qualified

The late Neoplatonic philosopher Simplicius claims in chapter 8 of his *Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories* that the quality is prior according to nature to the qualified. His discussion of the different types of priority that Aristotle distinguishes in *Categories* 12 and *Metaphysics* Δ, 11 shows that natural priority has to be understood as ontological priority. Ontological priority, however, appears to be ambiguous as it includes an essential and an existential aspect. There is a lively debate in scholarship on Aristotle whether ontological priority in Aristotle is primarily essential priority or whether essential priority also implies existential priority. In any case, most scholars opt for a distinction into both of these aspects. A closer look at Simplicius’ presentation of ontological priority shows that he either does not distinguish these aspects or regards them as being intrinsically linked. However, several passages in chapter 8 strongly suggest that the quality and the qualified are co-existent. This leads to the conclusion that whether or not Simplicius distinguishes ontological priority into essential and existential priority, the reader, provided he or she wants to assume that the account of the natural priority of quality over the qualified in Simplicius is coherent, has to make this distinction.

Thomas Jeschke (Cologne): Durand on the Soul: A Paradigm of 14th-Century Philosophical Psychology

Durandus of St. Pourçain’s theology/philosophy is characterised by a combination of Aristotelian and Augustinian elements. On the one hand, Durandus was influenced by the new way of doing theology and philosophy, which Thomas Aquinas introduced and which the Dominican Order wanted to impose on all his members; on the other hand, he was still influenced by the old, traditional way, which was mostly influenced by Augustine. One can exemplify this combination by looking at Durandus’ theory of the soul. Following Thomas Aquinas’ interpretation of Aristotle, he identifies e.g. the soul as unique substantial form and sole bearer of personal identity and therefore opposes the Franciscan tradition of a plurality of forms in man. Yet, when it comes to explain knowledge, Durandus deviates from Aquinas’ adoption of Aristotle and his agent/possible intellect and adheres to a more Augustinian/Franciscan view, which understands the soul/the intellect as an active potency, its objects merely as *causa sine qua non*. In his general account of psychology, namely whether the soul and its potencies are the same or differ, he clearly follows both traditions and, in fact, is a predecessor of Ockham, whose position becomes the fundamental anti-thomistic view in the 14th and 15th century. In that perspective, Durandus is a pivotal figure of the beginning 14th-century and his theory of the soul is paradigmatic for that time.

Can Laurens Loewe (Louvain): Thomist Truthmakers

Aquinas frequently claims that things in the world are the cause (*causa*) of the truth of a proposition. Although the general realist thrust of this claim is fairly obvious, the details remain unclear. How is the term ‘causation’ to be understood in this context? Does Aquinas want to say that a thing causes the truth in the same way as, say, a storm causes a power outage? Further, just what is the thing in the world that causes the truth of a proposition such as Socrates is wise? Is it a concrete entity such as Socrates’s wisdom or an abstract entity such as the fact that Socrates is wise? In my paper, I wish to address precisely these questions. By bringing Aquinas into dialogue with some contemporary views of truthmaking (Armstrong, Mulligan, Simons, Smith), I wish to show (at least in part) what a Thomist theory of truthmaking would look like. For convenience, I will restrict myself to nonmodal empirical propositions. I will argue first that the mode of causation involved in a thing’s causing the truth of a proposition is one of formal causation. Second, I will argue (contra Wippel) that truthmakers are, for Aquinas, not states of affairs, but concrete entities, specifically, substances or substance-accident-compounds. Finally, I will inquire how, given this account of truthmakers, Aquinas accounts for the truthmakers of past contingent propositions (a largely unexplored topic as compared to future contingent propositions). I will try to assess whether Aquinas holds the view that e.g. the proposition that Caesar was assassinated in 44 BC once had a truthmaker, but does not have one anymore.
Smilen Markov (Sophia/Veliko Turnovo): The Epistemic Structure as an Animate Statue – Psellos’ concept of Christian Philosophy

For Michael Psellos, the Byzantine polyhistor of the 11th c., Christian philosophy is a manifestation of true being in human existence and has the task to “present man as God on the earth”. The self-articulation of God has an ontological but also an epistemic character, the latter being subordinate to the former. Following Dionysios the Areopagite, Psellos demonstrates the epistemic validity of divine Revelation by ‘Christianizing’ the ontological model of Proclos’ hierarchy. Whereas Dionysios describes the transition from philosophical speculation on divine Revelation towards pure contemplation (θεωρία), Psellos is interested in the possibility for preserving the idea of a creative and a providential principle on each level of rational discourse.

This requirement poses the antinomy ‘unity-multitude’ as an identity problem of the human subject of knowledge. The main concern of Psellos is not the analogy between created being and the characteristics of divine being, as is the case by Dionysios, but the formulation of epistemic principles, which enable human intellect to delve into different regions of knowledge, without destroying its own integrity, as well as the coherence between cognition and Revelation.

Psellos solves the identity problem of the subject of knowledge by adopting a practical principle in epistemology, instead of the theoretical monistic approach of Christian Neo-Platonism. In order to determine the scientific field, which most properly corresponds to the truthful philosophical life, Psellos does take into consideration the closeness of the subject of a particular science to pure noetic contemplation and, respectively, to the simplicity of divine being. However, he accentuates especially on the existential dimensions of philosophical activity. In his Letter to Xiphilinos Michael recommends rhetoric as an appropriate field for practicing philosophy. This has a special epistemic reason. For the subject of knowledge, who fluctuates between the simplicity of pure contemplation and the multitude of contingent being, rhetoric provides a kind of ‘rest’: it constructs a “watch-tower” (παρακολούθησις), lying equally remote from the theoretical scientific discourse and the changeable facticity of the created world. Such scientific occupation creates an existential habitus, which allows for communion with God. This special mode of philosophical vita activa is represented as an alternative of the traditional Christian ascetic ideal. Both these ways of practicing philosophy are in accordance with the concept of Christian philosophy, typical for Byzantine culture. This model determines a rule for hierarchisation of the epistemic field, its basic requirement being the integrity of the human person. The paradigm of this integrity is the animate statue – a topos in Psellos’ philosophy denoting the coherence of beauty and truth in human life.

Sabrina Mock (Cologne): Handeln gemäß bestem Logos – Zum Verhältnis von gerechtem Handeln und Gesetzesbefolgung in Platons Kriton

Die Frage, ob und warum man geltende Gesetze befolgen sollte, ist bis heute hochaktuell, wird aber bereits von Platon in einem seiner frühesten Dialoge, dem Kriton, thematisiert. Dort steht sie in einem größeren Zusammenhang: Im Rahmen der Frage, wie Sokrates auf Kritons Vorschlag aus dem Gefängnis zu fliehen, reagieren soll, stellt Sokrates seine Handlungsprinzipien vor, an denen er sich zeitlebens orientierte.

Im Zentrum meines Dissertationsprojektes steht die Frage nach dem Verhältnis zwischen gerechtem Handeln und Gesetzesbefolgung im Kriton. Während das gerechte Handeln zum Beispiel in der Apologie, im Gorgias und in der Politia eine zentrale Rolle spielt, die Gesetze unter anderem im Politikos und in den Nomoi, setzt der Kriton diese beiden Themen miteinander in Bezug. In seiner Interpretation bis heute sehr umstritten, scheint der Kriton diesbezüglich jedoch einige Fragen aufzuwerfen:


Eine der ersten Fragen, die sich nach der Betrachtung der stark divergierenden Forschungspositionen zum Kriton stellt, ist die Frage nach der Funktion der Einführung der personifizierten Gesetze Athens. Welches Ziel verfolgt Sokrates mit

This paper is a synopsis of the book I wrote (in French) during the first part of my stay as post-doctoral fellow in Montreal, under the supervision of Claude Panaccio (Chaire de Recherche en Théorie de la Connaissance du Canada). I expect to send the book to Vrin at the end of 2013. It is entitled (English translation) “William of Ockham’s Essentialism. The Semantics, Epistemology and Metaphysics of Real Definition”. It deals with a field of Aristotelian logic which disappeared from logic handbooks in the 1920ies, the theory of real definition. More precisely, the book consists in a philosophical study of William of Ockham’s theory of real definition. William of Ockham is a theologian from the 14th Century known for his nominalism (i.e. the thesis that there are only individuals). He is also a logician of preeminent standing whose theory of definition is worth studying for the reasons that I will explain in this synopsis. I will firstly lay out the aim and nature of my investigation. I will secondly describe the philosophical and historical background of the study. Finally, I will sum up the contents of the book, its main results, and its significance in the field of medieval studies and for the contemporary striving to come back to an Aristotelian kind of essentialism.

Friederike Schmiga (Bari): Intellectual Curiosity in Medieval Philosophy

The aim of this talk is to present some general reflections on the topic of my PhD thesis, intellectual curiosity in medieval philosophy. While the starting point of the project are two contrasting conceptions of human knowledge, namely the desire for knowledge in Aristotle and curiosity in Augustine, the main focus will be on the way in which these two models of knowledge were received and came into tension in the 13th century. Both Aristotle and Augustine acknowledge the existence of a desire for knowledge that belongs to human nature. Interestingly, the same aspects are involved in both conceptions (e.g. the prominent role of the sense of sight, the value of knowledge measured in terms of speculative) but they are interpreted in radically different ways. In principle, whereas the desire for knowledge is seen as a perfection of human nature in Aristotle, curiosity is seen as one of the soul’s major imperfections in Augustine. Many Latin authors in the Middle Ages were influenced by Augustine’s position towards curiosity in various ways and degrees but the issue did not come to the fore as long as the idea of what role learning and knowledge should play in the life of a good Christian remained uncontested. The problem returned with renewed urgency in the 12th and 13th century when the translation wave gave the Latin West access to Greek and Arabic works of speculative philosophy and thus to the Aristotelian conception of intellectual curiosity as a natural desire for knowledge; and especially in the 13th century when the search for knowledge became institutionalized in the university. An example of how the tension between Augustinian ideas about curiosity and the Aristotelian notion of a natural desire was resolved is provided by Aquinas' questions on studiosity and curiosity in the Summa Theologiae, which I will briefly present.

Philipp Steinkrüger (Louvain): Aristotle on Beauty and Mathematics

In Metaphysics M3 Aristotle states that contrary to the opinion of some people, ‘the mathematical sciences speak and prove very much about the beautiful and the good; […] for, the main forms of the beautiful are order, due proportion, and definiteness, which are what the mathematical branches of knowledge demonstrate to the highest degree’. Aristotle was neither the first nor the last philosopher who claimed that concepts like proportion and order can explain the obscure notion of beauty (e.g. Plato, Philebus 64e and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Iª q. 39 a. 8); however, for Aristotle, and in particular given his theory of demonstration, the idea that mathematics is able to explain beauty comes as a surprise. Indeed, when Aristotle, in Posterior Analytics I.7, illustrates his kind-crossing prohibition he explicitly states that ‘it is impossible to prove by geometry whether the straight line is the most beautiful of lines’, a demonstration we should certainly expect to be possible if mathematics can explain to which objects beauty can legitimately be attributed. In my paper, I will analyse the two passages in the Metaphysics and the Posterior Analytics and the ideas proposed therein in
order to shed some light on the question whether the apparent contradiction is a real one or whether there are ways to avoid it.

Qi Wang (Leiden): Boethius’ Mathematics. Introduction of Boethius’ Arithmetic and Music and Their Application in the Consolation of Philosophy

In Boethius’ division system, mathematics is one of theoretical philosophy. Mathematical works were the first kind of Boethius’ works, which shows the role of mathematics in thoughts of Boethius: mathematics is the basic knowledge. Of these mathematical works, only the De Institutione Arithmetica and, incompletely, De Institutione Musica survive. The De Institutione Arithmetica deals with the pure mathematics; and the De Institutione Musica touches upon the applied theory of numbers. By the study on numbers, Boethius found out the intrinsic harmony which served for the philosophy, that is to say, what he focused on is not the numbers’ mathematical meaning or the practical use, but the philosophical meaning. Mathematics for Boethius functions first and foremost to set the mind free from matter, and while arithmetic introduces the student to the numerical expression of quantity, music takes the enlightened mind a step further toward reasoning about the pure and incorporeal essences of philosophy. Boethius’ works on arithmetic and music are not considered to be original ones. However, Boethius composes these works according to his purpose, which is to make the Latin-speaking world familiar with the classic Greek knowledge. Thus, the way of writing his works represents Boethius’ own characteristic. For arithmetic is so elementary that in Boethius’ last but famous work, the Consolation of Philosophy, he employs many ideas of arithmetic, such as the theory of equality, unity and nature of number. In my presentation, I will focus on these main arithmetical theory and demonstrate how they are used in the Consolation of Philosophy. As another important discipline, music is also used in Boethius’ last work. The main theory of music used is three kinds of music, which I will introduce in my presentation later.

Thomas Wauters (Louvain): Thinking of matter in Gregory of Nyssa’s De Opificio hominis. The absence of a substrate to the material world

The works of Gregory of Nyssa, especially the De Opificio Hominis and the Apologia in Hexaemeron, show clearly that the fourth century bishop and theologian struggled with the ontological status of matter, and from these works can the solution that Gregory proposes for the problem sketched here be distilled. Gregory, as a scion both of the Christian tradition and of pagan philosophy, found himself beset by a dilemma, at the one hand forced to reject a God analogous to the Platonick Demiurg in his creating activity – as this meant that there had to be a material substrate coeternal with the biblical creator of the universe – and at the other hand not being able to explain how an intelligible entity could have been the progenitor of matter, the stuff of which the entire sensible world is built. Indeed, the like produces the like, was a philosophical axiom already put forth by Aristotle, and Gregory would certainly agree with him. He solves the problem by expounding a theory that there is not something as matter per se. Matter, the stuff out of which the visible world is built, is essentially a conglomerate, a combination of qualities. Mass, depth, width, color, etcetera: all and more of these intelligible qualities seem to constitute what we perceive as matter, but are not to be seen as imprinted upon an already existing, unqualified material substrate, be it a coeternal substrate or one created by God. As a result, matter seems to have an ‘immaterial’ status, meaning that broken down, one would find only immaterial qualities constituting sensible object. And so, for Gregory it is clear that the intelligible nature of God does not stand in the way of him being the creator of the sensible world.

This theory has been discussed, to name a few important works, most recently by Charlotte Kockert in her book Christliche Kozmologie und Kaiserzeitliche Philosophie (2009) and by Richard Sorabji in Matter, Space and Motion (1988).

Using fragments from the De Opificio Hominis, I will first explain in some detail how this theory of Gregory functions. Secondly, I will argue that, the positive connotation Gregory applies to matter – its existence is grounded in the act of creation itself, without having to brought from without by the creator, and without being utterly different from him – allows him to put certain aspects of human life in a more positive light as well: our bodies are much more than the mortal coil in which our soul resides, they are necessary for the soul to exist and operate, and are subsequently seen fit to be examined at a considerably detailed level by Gregory (chapter 30 of the OH, which deals with all matters medical and physiological). It seems that matter and the material world, on the overall, does not bear the metaphysical formlessness it was ascribed by the Neo-Platonists, nor do the crippling moral implications of this formlessness adhere to the material world. All bodies, even in their most basic forms, already testify of form, and consequently, of beauty, because for Gregory the formless substrate which functioned as the bearer of qualities, both in Platonic and Aristotelian thought, is taken out of the equation.
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Directions to your hotel:

From Schiphol (airport):

Take the train to Amsterdam Zuid. Trains from Schiphol leave every 5 minutes during the day. You can buy tickets at the vending machines. You can walk to your hotel if you stay at Qbic. To do this, take the exit labeled ‘WTC’ and enter the WTC through the doors on your right. The hotel is situated inside the building. If you stay at Hampshire Hotel, take the exit labeled ‘WTC’ as well. Instead of entering the building, keep walking straight while keeping on your right. Go up the stairs on your right. There, take tram 5 (in the direction of ‘Centraal Station’) and get off at the stop ‘Stadionweg/Beethovenstraat.’ Follow the tramtracks to the north. Hampshire Hotel is located on your right (number 43).

From Amsterdam Centraal (train):

Take tram 5 (in the direction of ‘Amstelveen Binnenhof’). For Hampshire Hotel, get off at the stop ‘Gerrit van der Veenstraat.’ Follow the tramtracks to the south while keeping on your left. Hampshire Hotel is located on your left (number 43). For Qbic, get off at ‘Station Zuid.’ Descend the stairs next to the platform and walk towards the WTC-building (towards the station, on your left). The hotel is situated inside the building.

Directions to the VU from your hotel:

From Hampshire Hotel, take tram 5 (in the direction of ‘Amstelveen Binnenhof’). Get off at ‘De Boelelaan/VU.’ From Qbic, you can either take tram 5 or walk. To walk, go through the station, turning right after you passed a crosswalk. Keep following the sidewalk until you see the VU-building.

Directions to the city center:

From either Hampshire Hotel, Qbic or the VU-building take tram 5 in the direction of ‘Centraal Station.’ You can get off at, for example, de Dam (Dam Square) or Leidseplein.
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