EGSAMP SOMMERSCHULE 2019
11–12 September, Varna, Bulgarien

Die Dionysischen Traditionen

11. September, Mittwoch

9.00
Sitzung im Rahmen des S.I.E.P.M. Colloquiums

Lars Reuke – “Life” as a divine name and as a natural phenomenon

Robert Maximilian Schneider – Energeiai of the soul: Ps.-Dionysius and the foundation of Eriugena’s theory of the liberal arts

Vasilen Vasilev – Anselm of Canterbury and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite: A Possible Dialogue

Boris Chupetlovski – The Pseudo-Dionysian Influence in Dante’s “Divine Comedy“


14.00
Marta Georgieva – Ὁ Ἀνάδοχος: a conductor guide for the uninitiated soul
Luba Stefanova – Image as an Imprint of God according to the Symbol Theory of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite

15.30
Elitsa Kaldramova – Peter Abelard’s conceptualism and its influence
Mario Loconsole – Why do Philosophers generate foolish Children? Complexio of Bodies, Soul and Mind in Albert the Great’s Theory of Generation
16.45  
Lingchang Gui – Aquinas’ evaluation of the assertion “quantum intendis, tantum facis” for sinful actions  
Simeon Mladenov – Petrus Iohannis Olivi on freedom of the will and the active nature of knowledge

12. September, Donnerstag

9.30

Marilena Panarelli – The Development of the Doctrine of Flavours during the Middle Ages

Valerio Bonanno – Argumentative patterns and biblical exegesis: a survey within the Dominican masters of the 13th century  
Giorgia De Simone – Utrum somnus sit privatio vigilie - John of Jandun on sleep  
Antoaneta Dontcheva & Georgi Kapriev – The Time, Beckett and the Philosophers

12.30 Studienreise: Aladja Kloster und Kap Kaliakra

20.30 Schlussworte
“Life” as a Divine Name and as a Natural Phenomenon

Lars Reuke

Already Aristotle in his Categories dealt with the question whether “life” is to be taken as an equivocal, univocal or analogous term. He comes to the conclusion that, ultimately, life is an equivocal term: The life of the rose is similar only in name to the life of the lion or the life of a human being.

In my paper, I would like to deal with the question of the equivocity of life in a much more specific sense: As it is well known, life is one of the names Dionysios assigns to God. On the other hand, life is a biological or physiological phenomenon. I want to shed light on the possible relations between this Dionysian theological notion of “life” and its physiological counterpart: Can theological life be reconciled with physiological life? Are there structural similarities between the two? Or is God’s life a completely different beast than “ordinary” celestial and sublunar life? If so, how can we both call life? Or is it rather, that, if God is taken as the highest cause, he makes things alive insofar he himself has life? Most of all: What does life mean with respect to God and with respect to other beings?

Dionysios defines divine life as “supervivens vita vivificativa (ζωτικὴ) et substantificativa (ὑποστατική)” (PG 3, 856B). From this definition, some questions emerge: Is there any possibility for us to speak of this supervivens vita in terms of biological life – be it celestial or sublunar? On the other hand, can we speak of ordinary life in terms of life understood as a divine name? Is this predication univocal, equivocal or analogic?

To tackle these questions, I will analyze not only the relevant passages from Dionysios’ text, but also Albert the Great’s commentary on the Divine Names as well as texts from Renaissance and Early Modern authors. Ficino for example remains suspiciously tight-lipped about the meaning of the divine names in his commentary on the Divine Names, but treats the notion of divine life much more exhaustively in his commentary on the Parmenides. I will also analyze passages from Early Modern authors with a less theological leaning and with a stronger background in natural philosophy, such as Fortunio Liceti. This will give me the possibility to put divine life in contrast to biological life.
**Energeiai of the soul: Ps.-Dionysius and the foundation of Eriugena’s theory of the liberal arts**

*Robert Maximilian Schneider*

Eriugena’s Periphyseon is at its core a speculative approach towards the concept of nature based on the art of dialectics. But within this broad framework, Eriugena finds many opportunities for extensive digressions regarding his own methodology. This implies that Periphyseon should also be read as a ‘groundwork’ on the artes liberales, and especially dialectics, which Eriugena explicitly identifies as “mother of the arts”. Dialectics is the one of the trivial arts which is grounded in the “nature of things” and thereby becomes a kind of ontology. Furthermore, it is the methodological basis of all the other arts and sciences because it provides the basic instruments of all scientific endeavour, the rules and concepts of logic. Finally, Eriugena defines OUSIA as the actual object of the ‘universal art’ of dialectics, but he goes beyond that by also defining OUSIA as the origin of dialectics. That means in dealing with OUSIA as its main object and its origin, dialectics receives a self-referential turn which ultimately enables it to represent the whole movement of nature from its origin in God through creation and towards its final goal, the return into its primal cause, in an intelligible manner. To establish this in several aspects highly remarkable concept of dialectics, Eriugena refers to Ps.-Dionysius’ Cael. Hier. XI,2 where the divine thoughts are structured in OUSIA, DYNAMIS and ENERGEIA. Eriugena refers to this passage several times and develops from it a general theory of mind and nature in which he embeds the liberal arts as ENERGEIAI of the soul. My presentation aims at shedding some light on Eriugena’s bold approach towards the Dionysian text with a special focus on its function as a mainstay for Eriugena’s theory of dialectics.

**Anselm of Canterbury and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite: A Possible Dialogue**

*Vasilen Vasilev*

In the following text I examine the possibility of a dialogue between Anselm of Canterbury and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. The main thesis that I will defend here is that there are certain implications for an
The apophatic dimension of our knowledge of God in Anselm that enable us to claim that a possible connection between him and Pseudo-Dionysius is tenable, and extends between mere analogy, thereby showing that some important aspects of their thought are common. It must be noted that such a claim does not by any means presuppose that Anselm somehow has read Pseudo-Dionysius or heard of him, which would be wrongful to the historical truth. As opposed to that, I will try to show that the presence of such connection pertains exclusively to how we know God and by what standards this knowledge is rendered meaningful. By standards I mean the norms or principles that enable knowledge. Such, I claim, both for Pseudo-Dionysius and Anselm are God and the principles of reason. Nevertheless, the latter do not extend over the former. Therefore, God is the absolute norm of all knowledge. This would have a few further implications that I deem crucial. Both Anselm and Pseudo-Dionysius stress the role of our ontological and epistemological finitude and the unboundedness of God. For both, God regarding knowledge is constituted as an “elusive” object, as something that transcends the boundaries that constitute not only the subjectivity of the knower but also the objectivity of what is being known. The most approximate way of knowing God possible for us in this life is by His own givenness - that is, by grace. But God`s grace towards us is namely His love. Therefore, for Anselm and Pseudo-Dionysius as essentially Christian thinkers, love is the ultimate condition rendering knowledge possible. This should give us grounds to point out the emphasis on God`s goodness over His being that is common to both. In this sense, I will show how the love of God is essentially linked to knowledge but also pertains to a deeper ontological dimension, nevertheless uncapable of subsuming love within the frames of ontology. As far as God is Love and transcends the boundaries of being, ontology cannot have love as its proper object and therefore objectify God. Having that said, the effort of my text is to show that at least in the case of Anselm of Canterbury and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite Christian philosophy should not be placed on the same footing as ontotheology.

**The Pseudo-Dionysian Influence in Dante’s “Divine Comedy”**

*Boris Chupetlovski*

This paper attempts to follow the impact of the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus in “The Divine Comedy”, by Dante Alighieri. The aim of this text is
to examine the neoplatonic elements in the “comedy” in order to put a spotlight on its theological aspect. For this reason, the attention is drawn not only to the directly used Pseudo-Dionysian angeology, but also to the mystical character of the poem and its approach of describing the indescribable.

**O \( \textit{Anádóchos} \): A Conductor Guide**

\textit{O Anádóchos: a conductor guide for the uninitiated soul}

\textit{Marta Georgieva}

The present text examines the traits of character of the \( \textit{ánádóchos} \) in Dionysius’s \textit{On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy}. \( \textit{ ánádóchos } \) (sponsor, baptismal receiver, surety, and godparent) is the leader of the way to the Hierarch, and the mediator between the Church and unholy person. The Sponsor is a reliable conductor in the path to the light. Uninitiated needs surety to participate in religious performance and initiated undertakes superintendence of his introduction and all uninitiated’s life after the holy birth in God. The Baptismal receiver possesses a significant role in the threefold ministry on the first step of the sacred elevation: first – accept-
Image as an Imprint of God
according to the Symbol Theory
of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite

Luba Stefanova

The paper sets its aim to examine the multifaceted nature of symbol in the context of the Christian Neoplatonism of the Areopagitics. Referring to a Prototype which is transcendent and tangible at the same time, the symbolic image plays the role of an intermediary within a hierarchical structure leading man in his ascent to God. The symbol plays the role of such an intermediary due to its ability to refer to other images and to unfold itself in a hierarchical series. Turning from top to bottom we reflect on the procession of God into the world of living creatures. It is done via the uncreated Divine energies through which the εἴδη from their pre-existing state in the Divine Mind take visual shape in the world. Using the idea of Pseudo-Dionysius about the most appropriate image of God in the world, I will draw on the notion of the imprint (ἀντίτυπον) of God in it because this is the initial state of the image in which it still remains at the point of its own hypostatic identity. What will be explored is how the visual imprint could manifest the transcendent Divine essence turning into a symbol but never actually to express it.

Peter Abelard’s Conceptualism
and Its Influence

Elitsa Kaldramova

The main focus of the paper is Peter Abelard’s conceptualism as an answer to the medieval problem of universals. The formulation of the problem by Porphyry is discussed as well as Abelard’s moderate concept in comparison with realism and nominalism. Conceptualism holds that the universals (genus and species) are notions - words with precise mean-
ing which contain information about the world and the objects in it. The significance of the problem of universals, the influence of conceptualism and the important role of notions for thinking and understanding are also considered.

**WHY DO PHILOSOPHERS GENERATE FOOLISH CHILDREN?**

**COMPLEXIO OF BODIES, SOUL AND MIND IN ALBERT THE GREAT’S THEORY OF GENERATION**

*Mario Loconsole*

Purpose of the present study is to demonstrate the close link between the immateriality of the soul and the material aspect of the *complexio* of bodies in Albert the Great’s natural philosophy. In *Quaestiones de animalibus*, XVIII, 4 Albert wonders, indeed, why philosophers generate mainly foolish children: this is due to the deep exercise of imagination and intellect, that weakens the *virtus naturalis* and prevents the sperm from transmitting at best both the *dispositiones corporales* and *dispositiones animae*. This idea implies not only that a bodily substance can convey qualities like *sapientia et scientia*, but also that the transmission of *dispositiones* may be altered because of the corruption of the sperm complexion. The *quaestio* calls into account Albert’s reception of Aristotle’s theory of *pneuma* and the role of sperm in the epigenetic theory of animal and human generation. Moreover, another specular question arises: what causes monstrosity in nature? In both cases bodies are responsible for influencing the development of mind and soul. Indeed, the complexion of the sperm *indigestum et malum* poorly conveys the *dispositiones animae*; likewise, *monstra* originate because form is received by a kind of matter non-harmonically digested and a kind of body badly organized.

**AQUINAS’ EVALUATION OF THE ASSERTION “QUANTUM INTENDIS, TANTUM FACIS” FOR SINFUL ACTIONS**

*Lingchang Gui*

Thomas Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of sins: mortal sins and venial sins. Mortal sins are divided into those directed against God and those directed against one’s neighbors or the society. In *de malo* q. 2 a. 2 ad
8, Aquinas holds that the validity of the assertion “quantum intendis, tantum facis” in the case of sinful actions is structurally similar to the validity of morally good actions: the gravity of mortal sins depends only on the intention of the action (vid. the gravity of caritas), so the quantum-tantum assertion in this case is valid, whereas the gravity of venial sins depends not only on the intention itself, but also on the intentional choice and execution (vid. the goodness of morally good actions related to creatures), so the quantum-tantum assertion in this case is invalid. In this paper, I argue that in spite of the similar validity structure of both variations of the quantum-tantum assertion, there is a fundamental difference. More specifically, there lacks a degree of the gravity of mortal sins, while caritas comes in degrees, and that is because the connection between God and a person is undermined by the mortal sin with the destruction of the principle of caritas, and this privation cannot be differentiated by degrees, so the punishment is absolute and permanent. On the other hand, a person's connection with God is not lost because of the venial sins that he commits, and therefore the punishment for it is limited and has different degrees. The special cases are the mortal sins committed against one's neighbors or the society, which by virtue of bearing the features of mortal sins and damaging the society at the same time, receive therefore both limited and permanent punishments.

Petrus Iohannis Olivi on freedom of the will and the active nature of knowledge

Simeon Mladenov

Petrus Iohannis Olivi was a Franciscan, whose philosophical approach had no analogy in the Medieval period. In the current paper we would like to propose a way of reading of Olivi’s innovations in the field of epistemology. According to Olivi the soul, regarding its ontological level, surpasses the body, given the fact that movement and activity can belong only to something that is immaterial, and therefore capable of moving itself. This primary activity of the soul manifests itself in a twofold manner. On the one hand the soul is a naturally active entity, and therefore, it has a natural active directedness – aspectus – towards the physical bodies. On the other hand, Olivi clearly designates the will as the one and only active potency in the human soul, since it is the only potency that – given its freedom – is able to move itself.
This double directedness of the human soul – one that is based on its natural activity and one that follows the free self-movement of the will – stands in the centre of Olivi’s unprecedented epistemology. The Franciscan explicitly rejects the predominant at the time Aristotelian approach, since it presupposes a primal role of the activity of external objects. Such an approach could easily become a danger for the active free will of the human being, and in order to avoid this Olivi develops a completely different epistemology – one based on intentionality, directedness and an active awareness in the moment of knowing. In the current paper we would like to discuss to what extent Olivi’s theory of the will is significant for his epistemology and what role exactly is given to the will in the process of acquiring knowledge.

**The Development of the Doctrine of Flavours during the Middle Ages**

*Marilena Panarelli*

During the Middle Ages the doctrine of humors became more embedded in the medical system and in the investigation of nature in general, as some other theoretical arrangements, like that of the doctrine of flavours, were strictly connected to it. Although the categorization of flavours was first attempted during the Antiquity by Aristotle and Galen, it was completely arranged in the field of Arabic medicine. In order to inspect how the doctrine of flavours developed, some significant texts will be taken into account, like Isaac Israeli’s *De diaetis universalibus* and Avicenna’s *Canon*, which are both sources of Albert the Great’s *De vegetabilibus*, on which the analysis of this paper will focus primarily. In these texts, flavours are not dealt with as just simple sensible perceptions, but as signs of the temperament, that is the *complexio* of the object to which they refer. In this respect, it is possible to state that flavours became an epistemological instrument for medical research. The case of Albert the Great’s *De vegetabilibus* is then peculiar, because he explicitly connects the term *sapor* with the term *experimentum*: flavour is namely the only way to have an *experimentum* of plants and their virtues, or better, according to Albert *Sapor est quod certissimum dat experimentum*: it is actually the most certain way to know which kind of medicinal properties a plant has.
ARGUMENTATIVE PATTERNS AND BIBLICAL EXEGESIS:  
A SURVEY WITHIN THE DOMINICAN MASTERS OF THE 13TH CENTURY

Valerio Bonanno

In the context of the well-known re-evaluation of the literal sense of the Scripture and in the wake of Hugh of Saint Victor’s tripartition of the exegetical methodology in littera, sensus and sententia, late-12th and 13th-c. Latin exegetes devoted great attention to the argumentative traits of the biblical discourse. Whilst the littera defines the grammatical, etymological and rhetorical figures used by the biblical author, the study of the sensus also covers the logic and semantic structure of his text (including dialectical and rhetorical reasoning). The sententia, for its part, concerns further philosophical or theological questions arising from these first two levels. According to this hermeneutical frame, this study will focus on the sensus, and, particularly, on the early Dominican exegetes’ identification of some argumentation patterns (such as the deductio ad impossibile), or of peculiar types of syllogisms (such as the so-called epicheireme), within the biblical text. To this end, an attentive reading of Albert the Great’s analysis of these formulas in his commentaries on Aristotle’s Analytica priora and Topica will be provided. Finally, the reading of some mid 13th-c. Dominican biblical commentaries will reveal both inconsistency and disciplinary ambiguity in the description of the deductio ad impossibile and of the epicheireme when they come to be identified within the biblical discourse.

UTRUM SOMNUS SIT PRIVATIO VIGILIE - JOHN OF JANDUN ON SLEEP

Giorgia De Simone

Is sleep a privation of waking? This is the second question raised by John of Jandun in his Quaestiones super libro de Somno et vigilia. My PhD thesis will mainly consist in the critical edition of this text. The research intends to examine more extensively this relevant topic emerged during the critical edition of this questions-commentary, presumably written by the author in 1309 in Paris. In the Middle Ages, the reference text for discussions on sleep, dreams and divination through dreams was Aristotle’s De somno et vigilia. Not
only has this book received much attention from famous scholars, but it has also attracted the attention of less-known, even if still relevant figures, as John of Jandun. This author was born in 1285/89 in Jandun and became a member of the Arts Faculty in Paris in 1310.

In *Quaestiones super libro de Somno et vigilia* John of Jandun interpreted some relevant passages of Aristotle’s *De somno et vigilia*. The work has been handed down in five manuscripts and four early printed editions. The text of the *Quaestio II*, entitled *Utrum somnus sit privatio vigilie* was accurately transcribed from the Ms. *L*, collated against the other witnesses of the text (*CEOQSVZ*); then a complete inquiry into the sources of the text was done.

The main topic of this question is analysed by John of Jandun from the point of view of Aristoteles and Averroes. Therefore, I would like to compare the two different positions through the edited text. The author essentially tried to define sleep and waking by using various concepts, such as privation, habitus or sense perception.

The purpose of my presentation is to see what happens if we put together Aristoteles and Averroes when talking about sleep and waking.

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**The Time, Beckett and the Philosophers**

*Antoaneta Dontcheva & Georgi Kapriev*

The text examines the possible effects of relevant time theories in the texts of Samuel Beckett. The focus is mostly on philosophers read or mentioned by Beckett: Augustine, Descartes, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson, Heidegger. Time is interpreted as external condition and as an internal characteristic, as well as their convergence. The article discusses time structure in Beckett’s texts as a concentrate of his existential experience in a debate with imposed time theories. He does not fully solidify with any of them and builds his own systematically understanding of the temporal or chronotope in his art.